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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
WEST VALLEY CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
RICHARD NORRIS, 
Defendant/Appellant. | 
Case No.: 990028-CA 
Priority Number: 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over appeals from the Third District Court 
pursuant to Section 78-2a-3(2)(e), of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case is an appeal from the conviction of Defendant, Richard Norris, on one count 
of Child Abuse, a Class B Misdemeanor. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On December 18, 1997 the City filed an Information charging Defendant with Child 
Abuse, based on events that occurred on November 15, 1997. A criminal bench trial was 
conducted before the Trial Judge, Anthony B. Quinn, on June 29, 1998. Defendant was 
found guilty. On September 14, 1998 Defendant was sentenced. Defendant then filed 
motions for a new trial and to dismiss. Both were denied by the Trial Court. This Appeal 
was filed on January 6, 1999, following disposition of Defendant's post-trial motions. 
C. Disposition in the Trial Court 
Defendant was found guilty of one count of child abuse, a class B misdemeanor. The 
Trial Court also denied Defendant's motions to dismiss and for a new trial. 
D. Statement of Facts 
On November 15, 1997 Shannon and Angie Norris, daughters of Defendant Richard 
Norris, arrived at his home to retrieve some personal belongings. Defendant was divorced 
from Jane Norris, mother of Shannon and Angie. While in Defendant's home, Angie and 
Defendant had an altercation in which Defendant grabbed Angie's arm and threw her against 
a wall. The impact caused Angie to hit her head against the wall, causing a lingering 
headache. Defendant also grabbed Angie with such force that her arm was bruised where 
he had grabbed her. 
Angie, Shannon, and Jane Norris reported the incident to the West Valley City Police 
on November 17, 1997. The officer took Angie's statement, but did not investigate further. 
The report indicated that Angie stated that she had no visible marks on her arm, but that she 
had bruises on the day of the incident. 
The City issued an Information charging Defendant with Child Abuse on December 
18, 1997. At a bench trial, the City offered the testimonies of Angie, Shannon, and Jane 
Norris, while the defense offered testimony from Donna Evans and Tamie Andreson. After 
considering the testimony and other evidence, the Trial Court found that Defendant was 
guilty. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
L The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Denying Defendant's Motion 
to Continue. 
Defendant did not prove that a continuance was necessary to procure the testimony 
of the absent witness. Defendant did not show that the desired testimony was material, that 
the witness was available within a reasonable time, and that Defendant had exercised due 
diligence to procure the witness. Thus, under State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750 (Utah 1982), 
the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion. 
Furthermore, denying the motion to continue did not constitute a constitutional 
violation. Defendant never requested a court order or certificate to compel the absent 
witness, so his right to compulsory process was never denied. 
II The Clear Weight of the Evidence Supports the Trial Court's Verdict and 
its Reading of the Law. 
The Trial Court relied on the undisputed eyewitness testimony of Angie and Shannon 
Norris. Defendant attempted to undermine the credibility of Jane Norris, and tried to 
overemphasize alleged inconsistencies in the police report. However, the Trial Court ruled 
that the testimony of the two sisters was undisputed, and the police report strengthened rather 
than undermined their testimony. The other witnesses provided little relevant informations 
and their veracity or potential biases were not an important issue. 
In addition, the Trial Court correctly applied the Utah Child Abuse Statute, Section 
76-5-109 of the Utah Code. That statute defines physical injury as an injury or condition that 
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impairs the physical condition of a child, including a bruise or contusion. The Trial Court 
ruled that bruising and lingering red marks constituted a physical injury within the meaning 
of the statute, an application that is consistent with law. 
III Defendant's Trial Counsel Provided Effective and Vigorous Representation. 
A review of the Trial Transcript shows that Defendant's Trial Counsel was effective 
and vigorous in his representation. Defendant adds nothing new to the argument that was 
already rejected by the Trial Court. There is nothing in the acts cited by Defendant that fall 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment, and Defendant cannot 
show how he was prejudiced by the allegedly deficient performance. 
IV Since Defendant Never Requested a Jury Trial, There Was No Need to Have a 
Record Advising Defendant of His Right to a Jury 
Because this was a misdemeanor prosecution, Defendant had to request a jury trial. 
UTAH R. CRIM. P. 17. No request was made. Therefore, the Trial Court was under no 
obligation to create a record advising Defendant of his right to a jury trial, and of Defendant 
specifically waiving that right. 
V the Delay in Sentencing Did Not Prejudice Defendant 
Defendant was sentenced within a reasonable time, and any delays outside of the 45-
day limit of URCP Rule 22 did not prejudice him. State v. Tyree, 2000 UT App 350. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION BY 
DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CONTINUE. 
A, The Defendant Failed to Prove that the Testimony Sought was Material, that it Could 
be made Available Within a Reasonable Time, or that Due Diligence had been 
Exercised to Procure the Testimony. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's motion to continue, 
because Defendant failed to prove that a continuance was necessary to procure the desired 
testimony. A decision on a motion to continue is within a trial court's discretion, and should 
be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. The Utah Supreme Court gave the 
following guidance on evaluating a motion to continue sought to procure the testimony of 
an absent witness: 
When a defendant in a criminal action moves for continuance in order to 
procure the testimony of an absent witness, such a defendant must show that 
the testimony sought is material and admissible, that the witness could actually 
be produced, that the witness could be produced within a reasonable time, and 
that due diligence has been exercised before the request for a continuance. 
State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982); see also State v. Oliver, 820 P.2d 474 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). The Defendant did not meet his burden of showing that the four 
factors listed in Creviston had been met. 
First, the Defendant failed to introduce any proof that the testimony of Officer Ovalle 
would be material to the case. "Testimony is material... if there is a reasonable probability 
that its presence would affect the outcome of the trial." State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 
274-75 (Utah 1985). The Transcript of the June 29, 1998 trial shows that Defendant's 
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counsel merely speculated as to what Officer Ovalle's testimony would be: 
The only additional thing we hope Mr [Ovalle] could give us was testimony 
as to the nature of witnesses when they spoke. He's the only person who has 
spoken to these witnesses or had a chance other that [sic] themselves within 
their own family. He's the only person who ever spoke to them, had a chance 
to look at the, look for injuries, that kind of thing, maybe question their 
veracity a little bit. . .. 
(Transcript at p. 2, In. 22- p. 3, In. 3; emphasis added). This statement shows that Defendant 
had no idea what Officer Ovalle's testimony would be. ("We hope" he will testify about the 
witnesses, and "maybe question" their veracity). This is the only justification Defendant 
presented for the continuance. There were no affidavits or other recorded statements of what 
the testimony would include. There was no proof that the testimony would reasonably affect 
the outcome of the trial. He did not meet his burden of showing that the testimony was 
material. 
If Officer Ovalle had testified, he could not offer any facts that are not recorded or 
otherwise available from more reliable sources. He did not investigate the crime scene, but 
only served in a clerical role by taking statements from the witnesses. Those statements were 
recorded and introduced as evidence. (See Transcript, at p.65, In. 19). Officer Ovalle could 
not testify as to whether those statements were truthful, only that he had accurately recorded 
them. The other witnesses were available, and could testify as to the facts. Again, there was 
no proof that the testimony would reasonably affect the outcome of the trial. 
Second, a motion for continuance should not be granted merely because the 
unavailable testimony might impeach another witness. "It is not an abuse of discretion to 
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deny a motion for continuance when the testimony sought is only for impeachment 
purposes." Creviston, 646 P.2d at 753. As has been pointed out, Defendant did not know 
what the officer's testimony would be, and only expressed a hope that the testimony might 
''question [the witness'] veracity a little bit." (Transcript at p. 3, In. 3). Since there was no 
evidence indicating what the proposed testimony would be, and since the proposed value 
would be for impeachment purposes, the evidence cannot be said to be material, and the trial 
court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion for continuance. 
Finally, Defendant also failed to prove that Officer Ovalle could be produced within 
a reasonable time, or that due diligence had been exercised to procure the witness. There was 
no evidence presented that Defendant had contacted the officer, and only speculation that he 
might be available "by the end of July." (Transcript at p. 1, In. 19). This also demonstrates 
that Defendant had not exercised due diligence to locate Officer Ovalle. Nobody seemed to 
know where he was, even though his whereabouts could be ascertained quite easily through 
the military. There was no evidence that the Defendant had attempted to contact Ovalle, and 
there was no subpoena issued for him.1 Because the Defendant failed to prove that Ovalle 
would be available within a reasonable time, and also failed to exercise due diligence in 
locating him, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to continue. 
1
 Defendant argues that due diligence was exercised by "requesting assistance from 
the prosecutor's office." (Appellant's Brief at 21). This is hardly the kind of due diligence 
required. 
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B. The Trial Court did not Violate Defendant's Constitutional Rights. 
The Defendant's constitutional rights were not violated because the trial court denied 
his motion for continuance. Defendant argues that denying his motion to continue violated 
his right to compulsory process of witnesses in his favor, guaranteed by the sixth and 
fourteenth amendments to the federal constitution, and Article I, Section 12 of the Utah 
Constitution. Defendant however, made no attempt to compel attendance by Officer Ovalle, 
so it cannot be said that his rights were violated. There is no evidence that the trial court 
denied Defendant's request for a certificate compelling Officer Ovalle to attend the trial. 
Since there no attempt to avail himself of his right to compulsory service, Defendant was not 
denied that right.2 
Defendant's argument that he suffered a constitutional violation simply reiterates his 
assertion that Officer Ovalle's testimony was material to the case. However, it has been 
shown that Ovalle's testimony was of potential value only for the purposes of impeaching 
the witnesses, and even that was very speculative. Officer Ovalle could provide no new 
information about the events in question, and the potential for impeachment was minimal at 
best. Even if the testimony were found to be material, there is still the absence of any attempt 
2
 The Defendant states that Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution was also violated, 
and requests that the Court analyze his claim under that provision. However, the Defendant 
presents no argument or justification that the state constitution ought to be read differently 
from the federal. There is no evidence presented that either the state or federal constitutions 
have been violated at all. Since there is no particular argument supporting a different 
interpretation of the Utah Constitution, there is no basis for such an analysis as requested by 
Defendant. See e.g., Schreuder, 111 P.2d at 275. 
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to compel Ovalle to testify. Defendant never attempted to use the court's power to compel 
witnesses, and so there was no violation. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that this issue was never argued before the trial court, 
nor is it adequately briefed. Appellate courts will only consider arguments that are 
adequately briefed. 
It is well established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that 
are not adequately briefed In deciding whether an argument has been 
adequately briefed, we look to the standard set forth in rule 24(a)(9) of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. This rule states that the argument in the 
appellant's brief "shall contain the contentions and reasons of the appellant 
with respect to the issues presented ...with citations to the authorities, 
statutes and parts of the record relied on." Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires 
not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and 
reasoned analysis based on that authority. We have previously stated that 
this court is not a depository in which the appealing party may dump the 
burden of argument and research. 
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998) (citations omitted); see also State in re RR, 
2001 UT App 66, f^ 8. Defendant presented no argument as to why the Utah Constitution 
should be read differently from the federal, and has included no argument other than a 
suggestion that this Court analyze the issue itself, even though the brief "wholly lack[s] legal 
analysis and authority to support his argument." State v. Washington, 772 P.2d 960, 996 
(Utah 1989). Thus, there is no merit in Defendant's allegation of a constitutional violation. 
To conclude, the Trial Court did not abuse its discretion by denying Defendant's 
motion to continue. There was no justification presented that the testimony sought from the 
absent witness would materially affect the outcome of the trial. Furthermore, Defendant did 
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not request that the Trial Court compel the attendance of that witness, so there was no 
constitutional violation of his right to compulsory process. 
II THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS 
THE TRIAL COURT'S VERDICT AND ITS READING OF 
THE LAW. 
The clear weight of the evidence supports the Trial Court's verdict that the Defendant 
was guilty of child abuse; and its interpretation of the child abuse statute was correct. 
Because the matter on appeal is from a criminal bench trial, not a jury trial, the Court's 
analysis is governed by State v. Gurr, 904 P.2d 238 (Ut. Ct. App. 1995): 
When reviewing sufficiency-of-evidence challenges from criminal bench 
trials, we must sustain the trial court's judgment unless it is 'against the clear 
weight of the evidence. . . . "[W]e will review the record to see if the clear 
weight of the evidence, not including demeanor and credibility, is contrary to 
the verdict." 
Gurr, 904 P.2d at 241 (quoting State v. Goodman, 763 P.2d 786, 787 (Utah 1987); other 
citations omitted). The record shows that the clear weight of the evidence supports the Trial 
Court's verdict. 
A. The Clear Weight of the Evidence Supports the Verdict 
The City introduced testimony from three credible witnesses which established the 
fact that the victim, Angie Norris, was injured by the Defendant, her father. Both Angie and 
her sister testified that Defendant grabbed Angie and threw her against a bedroom wall, 
causing her head to impact against the wall. Defendant grabbed his daughter with such force 
that it bruised her arm. The existence of the bruise was established by the testimony of the 
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victim, Angie; her sister, Shannon Norris; and their mother, Jane Norris. Defendant offered 
very little testimony to dispute the existence of these injuries. 
The defense offered the testimony of Donna Evans, who was working in the 
Defendant's home when the child abuse occurred. She confirmed that Angie and Shannon 
were present at the time, but did not witness any of the events that led to the abuse. She 
stated that she heard "muffled voices" upstairs, and that she did not believe those voices were 
arguing. She also stated that Angie was wearing a winter coat of some kind. However, her 
attention was focused on the work she was doing, and not on the events. Furthermore, she 
could not remember details such as the nature of the work she was performing, and even the 
exact day she was there, although she claimed to remember such trivia as the type of coat 
worn by a person she saw for only a moment. Ms. Evans was also a long-time employee of 
Defendant, which definitely raises the issue of bias. 
The defense then called Tamie Andreson, a former roommate of Jane Norris. Ms. 
Andreson's testimony amounted to nothing more than a vicious attack on Jane Norris's 
credibility, and did not include any information relevant to whether the child abuse occurred. 
Ms. Andreson testified that she had seen Jane Norris tell Angie and Shannon to lie about 
being abused by Defendant. However, it was never established when these statements were 
made, and if there was any connection to the child abuse in question, although it was implied 
that the statements were made shortly before the trial. Ms. Andreson's credibility was also 
questioned with allegations of drug abuse. The trial judge elected to disregard this testimony 
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as inadmissible under Rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. 
The police report, dated 17 November 1997, was introduced without objection. There 
was some dispute as to the date the child abuse occurred, but the facts in the report 
coiToborate the testimony of Angie and Shannon Norris, and serves as an accurate record 
made shortly after the events occurred. In the report Angie indicated that she had no visible 
marks at that time, but stated that Defendant's attack had caused bruising. The report not 
only corroborates Angie's and Shannon's testimony, it also supports their credibility because 
it is a statement made shortly after the events occurred. 
The Trial Judge acknowledged that the case was close, but felt that the eyewitness 
testimony of the two sisters was credible. The judge recognized that there were not the best 
of feelings between Defendant and his ex-wife, Jane Norris, but felt that her testimony 
supported a guilty verdict. As to the testimony of Donna Evans, the Trial Judge felt it was 
less reliable, and did not undermine the eyewitness testimonies. 
Defendant offered no direct evidence disputing the facts established by the 
eyewitnesses. Instead, the defense chipped away at the credibility of Jane Norris, and argued 
that the police report was unreliable. The Trial Judge stated that the report still corroborated 
the details of the sister's testimony, and there was no reason to conclude that it undermined 
those testimonies. 
To conclude, the Trial Judge correctly found that Defendant was guilty. The clear 
weight of the evidence supports this verdict. There were two eyewitnesses who testified, and 
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their testimony was corroborated by a written report. The defense could only attempt to 
undermine the witnesses' veracity, but the Trial Judge decided to believe the eyewitnesses, 
whose credibility was not sufficiently attacked. The other witnesses provided only peripheral 
information which contributed little to resolving the question of Defendant's guilt or 
innocence. 
B. The Trial Judge Correctly Interpreted the State fs Child Abuse Statute. 
The Trial Judge correctly interpreted Section 76-5-109 of the Utah Code, ruling that 
the bruises and discoloration on Angie's arm constituted "physical injury" within the 
meaning of the statute. The relevant portion of § 76-5-109 states: 
"Physical injury" means injury to or condition of a child which 
impairs the physical condition of the child, including: 
(i) a bruise or other contusion of the skin . . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-109(c) (1997 version).3 The Trial Judge held that persistent 
discoloration came within the definition of "physical injury." The testimony established that 
Angie Norris suffered bruising and lingering red marks on her arm, as a result of the 
altercation with the Defendant. This clearly falls under the definition quoted above. In 
addition, Angie reported an injury to her head, resulting in a headache which lingered for two 
days. This also must fall within the definition of "physical injury."4 
3
 Section 76-5-109 was amended in 1998, 1999, and 2000, but none of those 
amendments changed the language from the 1997 version, which was in effect when the 
events in question occurrred. 
4
 Note that the definition of "physical injury" does not attempt to include an 
exhaustive list of injuries, but lists examples of injuries that would fall under statute. 
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In short, there was nothing wrong with the Trial Judge's interpretation of the statute, 
and the clear weight of the evidence supported the guilty verdict. 
III. DEFENDANT'S TRIAL COUNSEL PROVIDED EFFECTIVE AND 
VIGOROUS REPRESENTATION. 
The Trial Judge correctly ruled that Defendant's Trial Counsel provided effective and 
vigorous representation, and that the Trial Counsel's performance did not fall below any 
reasonable standard. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant "must show that his 
counsel rendered deficient performance which fell below an objective standard 
of reasonable professional judgment and that counsel's deficient performance 
prejudiced him". . . . To prevail, Defendant "must identify specific acts or 
omissions that fell outside the wide range of professional assistance and 
illustrate that, absent those acts or omissions, there is a reasonable probability 
of a more favorable result." 
State v. Simmons, 2000 UT App 190, ^  4, 5 P.3d 1228, 1230 {quotingState v. Maestas, 1999 
UT 3 2 4 2 ° ; 9 8 4 p - 2 d 3 7 6 > 3 7 9 ; o t h e r citations omitted). To support his claim for ineffective 
assistance, Defendant simply refers the Court to his "Memorandum Supporting Motion for 
New Trial" filed before the Trial Court. {See Appellant's Brief, Exhibit "D"; hereafter 
"Memorandum"). The Defendant makes no other argument to support his contention. 
The specific acts identified by the Defendant to support his argument of ineffective 
assistance are as follows: 
1 The appointed counsel waived the Defendant's right to a jury trial; 
2 The appointed counsel did not attempt to subpoena Officer Ovalle to testify; 
3 The appointed counsel did not challenge the constitutionality of the statute; 
14 
4 The appointed counsel did not challenge the information. 
These acts will be addressed below.5 The Trial Court considered the Defendant's claims, and 
held that his trial counsel effectively represented him. 
1. Waiving the Defendant's Right to a Jury Trial was not Ineffective Assistance 
The Trial Court found that there was no evidence presented that the Defendant wanted 
a jury trial. The only notice served upon the Defendant indicated that matter was on a bench 
trial track. The court also noted that it was "not objectively unreasonable for trial counsel 
to have not pursued a jury trial." (See Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, 
West Valley City v. Norris, Case # 971005450; see also Appellant's Brief Exhibit "C".) 
Defendant simply presents the exact same arguments he made to the Trial Court. Since there 
is no new evidence, and no new argument, the Court should agree with the Trial Court and 
find that not pursuing a jury trial was not objectively unreasonable. 
2. Trial Counsel Attempted to Continue the Trial to Procure Testimony 
The Trial Counsel's performance did not fall below an objective standard of 
reasonable performance by failing to take more steps to secure Officer Ovalle's testimony. 
As has been discussed before, Defendant believes that Officer Ovalle might have provided 
useful testimony. However, there was nothing showing that the officer's testimony would 
5
 Defendant's counsel for the trial was Dean Ellis. The counsel for the post-trial 
motions and the beginning of the appeal was M. Karlynn Hinman, who was hired and paid 
by the Defendant. After Ms. Hinman withdrew, the Trial Court appointed the present 
counsel, despite the fact that the City presented evidence that the Defendant had sufficient 
assets to pay for representation. 
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provide any facts not already known. The Trial Counsel attempted to continue the trial in 
order to secure Officer Ovalle's testimony. The Trial Counsel repeated his request after the 
City had presented its case. The Defendant claims (without proof) that his Trial Counsel 
refused to take additional steps because of the cost involved. However, given the limited 
value of the testimony, it is not objectively unreasonable for the Trial Counsel to choose not 
to pursue the officer's attendance more than he already had. 
Furthermore, the Defendant has not established a reasonable probability that the result 
would have been more favorable if the Trial Counsel had taken more steps to secure the 
officer's testimony. The officer was not an eyewitness, and did not investigate the matter. 
He only recorded Angie Norris's statement. According to the Defendant, the officer could 
have testified that Angie stated that she had no bruises or marks when she made her 
statement. (See Memorandum at 5). However, that information is in the written report which 
was submitted into evidence. Thus, even if the officer had testified, he could offer no new 
information. There is thus no reasonable probability that if the Trial Counsel had taken more 
steps to secure the officer's testimony the result would have been more favorable for the 
Defendant. 
3. The Trial Counsel was not Ineffective Because he did not Challenge the 
Constitutionality of the Statute. 
The Trial Court properly held that the Trial Counsel's refusal to challenge the 
constitutionality of the Child Abuse statute was reasonable. The Defendant provided no 
evidence that he requested his Trial Counsel to raise a constitutional challenge, and also 
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provided little evidence that the statute was unconstitutionally vague. Since the issue was 
not adequately raised and argued before the Trial Court, and since there is no additional 
argument on the constitutionality issue, this Court should uphold the Trial Court's decision 
that the Trial Counsel's representation was not ineffective. Furthermore, the decision to 
pursue a constitutional challenge was within the Trial Counsel's discretion, and a decision 
not to proceed with such a challenge does not render his performance ineffective. 
4. There is no Evidence or Argument that the Information was Defective. 
Finally, the Defendant has provided no argument or evidence to support his contention 
that the Information filed in the case was defective. The challenge to the information simply 
implies that it is overbroad and vague, presumably because it directly quotes the language 
of the Child Abuse statute in the Utah Code. The Trial Court did not address the Defendant's 
argument, and this Court has been given nothing more than what was filed before the Trial 
Court. This issue was not adequately argued or developed before the Trial Court, and this 
Court should not indulge the Defendant now. Since there is no evidence or even argument 
linking the Information to the Trial Counsel's performance, there is no reason to decide that 
the Trial Council was ineffective. 
To conclude, there is no merit in the Defendant's argument that the Trial Counsel was 
ineffective. The specific acts cited by the Defendant are merely unsupported allegations. 
The Defendant has not met his burden of proof that those specific acts fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable performance, and that absent those acts, there is a reasonable 
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probability that the result would have been more favorable. In addition, the Trial Court 
observed that the Trial Counsel was "extraordinary" in his representation, a conclusion that 
is supported by the Trial Transcript. The Trial Counsel vigorously and effectively 
represented the Defendant, and his performance was not ineffective. 
IV SINCE DEFENDANT NEVER REQUESTED A JURY TRIAL, 
THERE WAS NO NEED TO HAVE A RECORD ADVISING 
DEFENDANT OF HIS RIGHT TO A JURY 
Defendant never requested a jury trial, so there was no need for the Trial Court to 
create a record of Defendant knowingly waiving his rights. Misdemeanors are not tried 
before a jury, unless the defendant requests a jury at least ten days before trial. "All other 
cases [i.e., misdemeanors] shall be tried without a jury unless the defendant makes written 
demand at least ten days prior to trial, or the court orders otherwise." UTAH R. CRIM. P. 
17(d). There is no record that Defendant made a written demand for a jury trial. As was 
discussed in Section III, there is also no evidence that Defendant even wanted a jury trial 
until after the verdict was in. Since there was no written demand for a jury trial, the Trial 
Court was under no obligation to create a record of Defendant knowingly waiving his right 
to a jury trial. 
V THE DELAY IN SENTENCING DID NOT PREJUDICE THE 
DEFENDANT. 
The Trial Court's decision to delay sentencing did not violate the Defendant's right 
to a speedy trial, because the Defendant was not prejudiced by the delay. This Court has 
recently held that "[T]he amount of time a defendant waits to be sentenced should be 
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reasonable, so there is no abuse of the [sentencing] court's powers, and that due 
consideration should be given to any time he may have served because of the delay." State 
v. Tyree, 2000 UT App 350, 1f 12; 17 P.3d 587, 590 (citations omitted). Furthermore, cc[r]ule 
22(a) [of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure] like its predecessor statutes, is to be read as 
directory, not jurisdictional." Id, 2000 UT App 350, ^ 15. In other words, a defendant 
should be sentenced within a reasonable time after conviction, but the 45-day limit of Rule 
22 is a directive, not a jurisdictional requirement. 
The Defendant was convicted on June 29, 1998. Sentencing was originally set for 
July 30, but was moved to September 14, 1998, because of conflicts in the Trial Judge's 
schedule. The Defendant was sentenced 31 days after the 45-day period outlined by Rule 22. 
Although the Defendant did assert his right to a speedy trial and sentencing, he failed to offer 
any supporting evidence that a delay would prejudice him. "The mere mention of an issue 
without introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority does not preserve [an] 
issue for appeal." Id. 2000 UT App 350, ^  11. Thus, the Defendant has no grounds to argue 
that he is prejudiced now. 
In addition, the Defendant was sentenced within a reasonable time. The sentencing 
was scheduled approximately one month after the 45-day period expired. The record does 
not show why the delay was necessary other than "conflicts" in the Trial Judge's schedule. 
However, there is also no evidence that Defendant received a greater or lesser sentence 
because of the delay, or that the Trial Judge obtained any information that affected his 
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sentencmg decision because of the delay. In short, the Defendant was sentenced within a 
reasonable time after he was convicted, and any delay that resulted did not prejudice him.6 
CONCLUSION 
To conclude, Defendant has presented no reason to overturn the decision of the Trial 
Court. The Trial Court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Defendant's motion to 
continue, because there was no proof that the testimony sought would have any impact on 
the trial. The clear weight of the evidence supports a guilty verdict, and the Trial Court 
correctly applied the Utah Child Abuse Statute. 
Furthermore, Defendant's Trial Counsel was extraordinary in his representation, and 
did nothing that fell below an objectively reasonable standard of care. Since Defendant had 
not requested a jury trial for his misdemeanor prosecution, there was no need to create a 
record of Defendant being advised of his right to a jury trial, and then waiving that right. 
Finally, Defendant was sentenced within a reasonable time, and even though sentencing was 
outside of the 45-day limit of URCP 22, the delay did not prejudice Defendant. 
For these reasons, West Valley City respectfully requests that the decision of the Trial 
Court be upheld. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 26th day of April, 2001. 
ELLIOT R7EAWRENCE 
Assistant City Attorney 
6
 Although it does not bear on the issue of delay in sentencing, it should be noted that 
Defendant has delayed prosecution of this appeal for nearly three years! 
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